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Traditional economic decision theory pro-
poses that people behave in certain ways
when faced with a well-formulated set
of alternatives and information. It is a
normative theory; it suggests that people
should act according to certain decision
rules, but not that they will necessarily do so
in reality. The standard assumption is that a
person has a utility function over all possible
outcomes, which defines the desirability or
usefulness of any given scenario. Traditional
utility theory asserts that in a decision
without uncertainty, a person should choose
the alternative resulting in the highest
level of utility, and that in a decision with
uncertainty, a person should choose the
alternative with the highest expected utility.
Detailed explanations are given by von
Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage
[1,2].
These ideas are generally sound and can
be valuable when used as a guide for decision
makers. However, it was initially thought
that they were also valuable as a descrip-
tive theory. It has since been determined
that people violate normative decision theory
in many clear and predictable ways. In this
article, we introduce and discuss several of
these interesting behavioral phenomena.
One of the earliest researchers to demon-
strate a deviation from expected utility
theory was Allais [3]. He distributed two
surveys. In the first survey, respondents
were asked to choose between the following
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two options (original amounts were in
francs):
Choice 1.
A: $1million for sure
B: 0.10 probability of $2million
0.89 probability of $1million
0.01 probability of $0
In the second survey, respondents were
asked to choose between the following two
options:
Choice 2.
C: 0.11 probability of $1million
0.89 probability of $0
D: 0.10 probability of $2million
0.90 probability of $0
The majority of respondents preferred A
to B, and preferred D to C.
Choosing A and D appears to be reason-
able. However, this example has been called
the Allais Paradox, because these two choices
contradict the idea that people are maximiz-
ing expected utility. If we let U0 represent
the person’s utility for $0, U1 represent the
person’s utility for $1 million, and U2 repre-
sent the person’s utility for $2 million, then
preferring A to B would imply that






If we examine the second survey choice,
we find that preferring D to C implies that
0.11U1 + 0.89U0 < 0.10U2 + 0.90U0.
This may not seem like a problem
at first glance. However, with simple
1
2 PARADOXES AND VIOLATIONS OF NORMATIVE DECISION THEORY






This is the exact opposite result of what
we saw in the first survey! It means that
regardless of the utilities of the three out-
comes, choosing both A and D (or both B and
C) contradicts the theory of expected utility
maximization.
Table 1 reveals the structure of the trans-
formation of the first choice between A and B
into the second choice between C and D. The
final column corresponds to the 0.89 chance
of the $1 million outcome received in either
A or B in the first choice. This $1 million
was replaced with a $0 in both C and D in
the second choice. Changing the amount of
this ‘‘sure thing’’ of getting the same outcome
of $1 million in the 0.89 probability outcome
in choice 1 to a different sure thing of $0
in choice 2 should not change the preference
order between the options. Savage (2, Pos-
tulate 2) called this the sure-thing principle,
which must be obeyed under expected utility
maximization.
This was one of the first clear demon-
strations of a systematic violation of the
principles of expected utility theory. That in
itself is a very influential finding. However,
we may want to ask why it happened. What
element of people’s underlying preferences is
not being captured by expected utility theory?
It turns out there are multiple explana-
tions for Allais’ results, but the main reason
they occurred is a phenomenon often referred
to as the certainty effect. Reducing the prob-
ability of a negative outcome from 0.01 to 0
is usually judged to be a greater improve-
ment than reducing the probability of that
same negative outcome from, say, 0.90 to
0.89. Expected utility maximization requires
Table 1. Allais Paradox
0.10 0.01 0.89
A $1 million $1 million $1 million
B $2 million $0 $1 million
C $1 million $1 million $0
D $2 million $0 $0
that preferences over gambles are linear in
probabilities, and in Allais’ example, they
clearly are not.
Another major finding in this area was
discussed by Ellsberg [4]. He conducted an
experiment in which subjects were presented
with a jar. The subjects were told that the
jar contains 30 red balls, and 60 balls which
are some unknown mix of yellow and black.
They were asked to choose between two
gambles:
A: Receive $100 if the ball is red
B: Receive $100 if the ball is black
The majority of participants chose gamble A.
They were then asked to choose between the
following two gambles:
C: Receive $100 if the ball is red or yellow
D: Receive $100 if the ball is black or yellow
Given this choice, the majority of partici-
pants selected gamble D. As in the Allais’
example, choosing both A and D seems rea-
sonable. However, this has been called the
Ellsberg Paradox, because it is also a viola-
tion of expected utility theory. It may not be
immediately clear how expected utility is vio-
lated, so let us write a participant’s estimated
fraction of black balls as B, and observe the
following contradiction:







Assuming that U($100)>U($0), this sim-
plifies to B < 1/3.
Choosing D implies that
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Assuming that U($100)>U($0), this sim-
plifies to B>1/3.
Thus, there is no consistent set of beliefs
(about the fraction of black balls and the frac-
tion of yellow balls) which allows us, using
traditional subjective expected utility theory,
to prefer both gamble A and gamble D. That
is, no single probability of drawing a black
ball would lead to this pair of responses.
However, there is a simple reason that most
people choose both gamble A and gamble D:
these are the choices for which we can eas-
ily compute the exact probability of receiving
$100. Ellsberg showed that not only do peo-
ple display aversion to risk, they also display
aversion to ‘‘ambiguity.’’ People tend to pre-
fer gambles for which they are confident that
they know the exact probabilities involved.
Table 2 shows the structure of this para-
dox. The choice between A and B is trans-
formed by changing the sure thing of $0 when
a yellow ball is chosen to a sure thing of $100
when yellow is chosen. So, if A is preferred
over B, then C should be preferred over D.
Possibly the most groundbreaking work
to bring violations of normative utility the-
ory to a wide audience is from Kahneman
and Tversky [5]. They highlighted two major
behavioral violations of expected utility max-
imization, and demonstrated themusing sim-
ple survey results.
Their first major violation resulted from a
very simple pair of questions:
1. Would you prefer to receive $3000 for
sure, or $4000 with probability 0.8?
2. Would you prefer to lose $3000 for sure,
or lose $4000 with probability 0.8?
Expected utility maximization does not
tell us precisely what the answers to these
questions should be. However, notice that in
Table 2. Ellsberg Paradox
30 Balls 60 Balls are Either Black or Yellow
Red balls Black balls Yellow balls
A $100 $0 $0
B $0 $100 $0
C $100 $0 $100
D $0 $100 $100
the second question, the expected value of
losing $4000 with probability 0.8 is −$3200.
It has greater risk than the sure loss, and a
lower expected value. Preferring the gamble
would imply that the person is risk-seeking.
Utility curves formed over total wealth
are almost always concave, implying risk
aversion.
The answers to these two questions were
startling. People (in aggregate) overwhelm-
ingly preferred receiving $3000 for sure in
question 1, and overwhelmingly preferred
losing $4000 with probability 0.8 in question
2. That is, they were clearly risk-averse in
question 1, and clearly risk-seeking in ques-
tion 2. Kahneman and Tversky also asked
similar types of questions in different con-
texts, using different probabilities and out-
comes. In all cases, they found that themajor-
ity’s preferred answer to the question dealing
with losses was the opposite of that for the
question dealing with gains. They referred to
this phenomenon as the reflection effect.
Since these people did not all have the
same level of wealth, it would be impossible
to construct a utility function over wealth
that could incorporate the reflection effect
and accurately represent these subjects’
responses. Instead, Kahneman and Tversky
proposed that people evaluate outcomes
as gains and losses rather than using the
resulting total wealth levels. Based on their
survey data, they postulated that people tend
to be risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking
over losses. Numerous subsequent studies
have demonstrated this phenomenon, yet it
is still not fully accepted or incorporated into
traditional economic theory.
Kahneman and Tversky also found nonlin-
earities in probability, and expressed them in
some more detail than Allais. In addition
to certainty effects, they found that peo-
ple tend to place too much weight on out-
comes with very small (nonzero) probabili-
ties. That is, they do not fully understand
or incorporate how truly unlikely these out-
comes are. They postulated that people treat
probabilities according to the weighting func-
tion shown in Fig. 1. The horizontal axis
represents the actual given probability, and
the vertical axis represents the probabil-
ity that people implicitly interpret it to be







Figure 1. Nonlinear application of probabilities as
observed by Kahneman and Tversky [5].
when making decisions. The ‘‘correct’’ inter-
pretation of probability, as implied by tra-
ditional expected utility theory, is given by
the 45degree dotted line. This graph incor-
porates the certainty effect (at both zero and
one), the overweighting of small probabili-
ties, and the underweighting of middle and
higher probabilities.
Another related behavioral phenomenon
is what Tversky and Kahneman [6] referred
to as loss aversion. Loss aversion states that a
loss is deemed to be more significant than an
equal-sized gain. The theoretical loss aver-
sion concept explains two other more specific
observed concepts. These two specific con-
cepts are the endowment effect and the status
quo bias.
The endowment effect is discussed by
Thaler [7]. The premise is that the loss in
utility from giving up an item is greater
than the gain in utility from acquiring it.
It was demonstrated experimentally by
Kahneman et al. [8]. They asked subjects to
place a monetary value on a cheap decorative
mug. The catch was that some subjects had
been given the mug beforehand, and others
had not. Since the mugs were assigned ran-
domly, there was no apparent reason that the
underlying preferences should differ between
those withmugs and those without. However,
they found that the subjects who were given
the mug placedmuch higher values on it that
those who were not. In one experiment, the
median value for the mug was $7.12 among
the subjects who had one, and $3.12 among
those who had not. In a second experiment,
these median values were $7 and $3.50,
respectively. This was clear evidence that
people tend to place much higher values on
items they possess, or are ‘‘endowed’’ with.
The status quo bias was discussed by
Samuelson and Zeckhauser [9]. Status quo
bias is a preference for remaining in the cur-
rent situation. The example that the authors
used dealt with financial investments. They
conducted an experiment in which several
different funds were described to the par-
ticipant. When participants were told that
they currently had money invested in one of
the funds, then they generally preferred that
fund to the others. When they were given a
‘‘neutral’’ scenario in which they did not have
money invested in any of the funds, then no
such bias was observed.
Loss aversion explains both the endow-
ment effect and the status quo bias. If a loss is
more significant than an equal-sized gain (in
terms of utility), then losing an item is clearly
more significant than receiving that same
item. It is not difficult to use loss aversion to
explain the endowment effect. To understand
the status quo bias, we can interpret a change
as ‘‘losing’’ the current scenario and obtaining
the new one. If the two scenarios are equally
desirable when viewed from a neutral per-
spective, then loss aversion suggests that the
decision maker will prefer the status quo.
Notice that in each of the two preceding
examples, if the outcomes were viewed in
terms of raw overall outcomes rather than
gains and losses, the groups would be facing
identical questions. In the endowment effect
example, both groups would be expressing
the difference in monetary value between a
‘‘mug’’ outcome and a ‘‘no mug’’ outcome. In
the status quo bias example, each individual
would be simply selecting the most desirable
fund.
One implication of expected utility the-
ory is that a person’s chosen course of action
should not depend on the manner in which
the alternatives are presented. If two deci-
sion situations involve the same outcomes
with the same probabilities resulting from
the corresponding alternatives, then the per-
son’s decision should be identical for both.
This property is called invariance. It is dis-
cussed by vonNeumann andMorgenstern [1],
PARADOXES AND VIOLATIONS OF NORMATIVE DECISION THEORY 5
and studied further by Arrow [10]. Invariance
is often violated in reality. These violations
are referred to as framing effects.
Tversky and Kahneman [11] conducted a
pair of surveys which demonstrated a clear
framing effect. In both survey scenarios, a
group of 600 people is about to be exposed to a
deadly disease. In the first survey, the choice
is whether to save 200 people for sure, or save
all 600 with probability 1/3 (and save nobody
with probability 2/3). The vast majority of
participants chose the sure option. In the
second survey, the choice is whether to allow
400 people to die for sure, or accept a 2/3
probability of all 600 people dying (and a
1/3 probability of nobody dying). The vast
majority of participants chose the gamble.
Look at those two survey questions again.
They are actually asking the same thing!
One is framed in terms of number of lives
saved, and the other is framed in terms of
number of deaths. The outcomes and their
associated probabilities, however, are iden-
tical. Simply due to the ways in which the
situations are described, we find that many
people’s preferences are completely reversed.
An observant reader may notice that this
particular framing effect occurs because one
question is described in terms of gains, and
the other in terms of losses. Tversky andKah-
neman [12] discussed this in greater detail.
As prospect theory tells us, people tend to
be risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for
losses.
One of the arguments in favor of using
a risk-averse utility curve over wealth is
the observation that most people will never
accept a 50/50 gamble between gaining and
losing $X, regardless of the value of X. This
implies a concave (risk-averse) utility func-
tion for wealth. Loss aversion is an alter-
native explanation for this observation; it
asserts that ‘‘−$X’’ has a larger effect on
utility than ‘‘+$X’’ does, without having to
assess or incorporate wealth level.
Loss aversion, along with Kahneman and
Tversky’s earlier data, implies that rather
than looking at potential overall wealth levels
when making decisions, people tend to view
outcomes as gains and losses relative to a
particular reference level. Kahneman and
Tversky’s [5] prospect theory suggests that
Losses −X X Gains
Utility
Figure 2. The utility function associated with
prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky [5].
people act according to a utility function1
similar to the one shown in Fig. 2, where the
slope of the utility is steeper when a loss of $X
is incurred thanwhen a gain of $X is incurred.
This idea alone can explain many real-world
deviations from traditional expected utility
theory. Baucells and Rata [13] demonstrated
empirically that using a reference point in
this manner is an important factor in risk-
taking behavior; Camerer [14] provides many
additional real-world examples.
Given that people do not always conform
to expected utility, there are different ways
to proceed. One is to investigate how to aid
people to do so. For example, Keller [15,16]
investigated how different visual representa-
tions of gambles (most promisingly drawings
of color coded balls labeled with the mone-
tary amount that would be received if a ball
is drawn) could lower violations of expected
utility for questions similar to the Allais
Paradox. Another approach is to relax the
assumptions required by expected utility and
1Kahneman and Tversky refer to this as a value
function rather than a utility function, and it is
generally understood to be an appropriate model
for preferences under certainty. However, they pro-
posed it initially based on observed preferences
over gambles, as we have discussed earlier. Thus,
to be consistent with our usage of the terms ‘‘value’’
and ‘‘utility,’’ we refer to the curve in Fig. 2 as a
utility function.
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construct generalizations of expected utility,
such as models that relax the requirement
of linearity in probabilities. Kahneman and
Tversky’s [5] prospect theory is themost well-
known generalized utility theory, but there
are many others.
Becker and Sarin [17] introduced a lottery-
dependent utility model that allows the util-
ity achieved in an outcome to vary according
to the lottery in which it occurs, but requires
the true probabilities to be used. Their model
was rather general, but can be used to explain
some violations of expected utility. Daniels
and Keller [18] tested this model experi-
mentally, and found that it was useful in
predicting choice among gambles, but not
noticeably better than expected utility when
actually determining decisionmakers’ under-
lying preferences. Some other generalized
utility models include weighted utility [19],
regret theory (20, 21), and skew-symmetric
bilinear utility [22,23]. For more examples
and detailed discussion the reader is directed
to Refs 24, 25, or 26.
In general, expected utility theory is quite
valuable as a normative theory for guid-
ing good decision making. However, between
the certainty effect, ambiguity aversion, the
reflection effect, the endowment effect, status
quo bias, loss aversion, and framing effects,
it is painfully apparent that people violate
the traditional theory in many clear and pre-
dictable ways.
A final question for thought: in the real
world, how often do these sorts of para-
doxes and violations occur? Certainly the
effects and biases that we have discussed
do exist, but how often do they lead to incor-
rect or suboptimal decisions? If they occur
very infrequently, then they are interesting
as academic issues only. However, if they do
come up reasonably often in the real world,
then they undoubtedly merit further study
and awareness.
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